Supply Chain Attack Simulation
Payload tampered. Agent refused.
An attacker intercepts the task payload in transit and substitutes a fund-theft instruction. Stvor computes SHA-256 of the received payload and compares it to the buyer's committed hash. Mismatch → execution blocked → escrow returned.
What this proves
Attack vector
Man-in-the-middle payload substitution
Defense
Cryptographic hash commitment at creation time
Business case
AI agents execute at machine speed — humans can't audit in time
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Supply Chain Attack Simulation
An attacker intercepts the task payload between buyer and agent — substituting a fund-theft instruction for the original task.
Stvor catches it before execution.
Stvor defense layer
CommitSHA-256(task_json) at creation
TransmitNormal channel (unencrypted ok)
VerifySHA-256(received) === committed?
If failBlock execution + hold escrow
ReceiptHMAC-SHA256 signed audit record
Key insight
The channel doesn't need to be secure. The commitment does. Stvor makes the payload tamper-evident, not tamper-proof.